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NOTE 

TRADE REGULATION-THE "BONA FIDE OFFER" OF SALE RE­
QUIREMENT IN THE PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICES ACT: 
Slatky v. Amoco Oil Co. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, Congress enacted the Petroleum Marketing Practices 
Act (PMPA), I which regulates terminations and nonrenewals of gaso­
line station franchises. The PMPA was passed following extensive 
congressional inquiry into complaints by franchisees of unfair termina­
tions and nonrenewals of their franchises by the major oil companies.2 
Title I of the PMPA, by delineating the specific grounds and precondi­
tions necessary for the termination or nonrenewal of a franchise, im­
poses statutory protections upon the franchise relationship for the sale 
of gasoline. The PMPA further requires that, in the case of nonre­
newal, the franchisor make a "bona fide offer" to sell his interest in the 
leased premises to the franchisee. 3 
This note discusses the PMPA and cases in which the "bona fide 
offer" of sale requirement imposed by the PMPA has been interpreted. 
Section I presents the historical background of the PMPA and sets out 
its provisions. Section II discusses the conflicting case law interpreting 
the term "bona fide offer." Some courts have used an objective stan-
I. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-41 (1982». 
2. 	 See infra text accompanying notes 9-28. The term "nonrenewal" is defined in the 
PMPA as: 
a failure to reinstate, continue, or extend the franchise relationship­
(A) 	at the conclusion of the term, or on the expiration date, stated in the relevant 
franchise; 
(B) 	at any time, in the case of the relevant franchise which does not state a term 
of duration or an expiration date; or 
(C) 	following a termination (on or after June 19, 1978) of the rel'!vant franchise 
which was entered into prior to June 19, 1978, and has not been renewed 
after such date. 
15 U.S.C. § 2801(14) (1982). The PMPA defines "termination" only as including "cancel­
lation." 15 U.S.C. § 2801(17) (1982). . 
3. 	 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(I) (1982). 
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dard'in defining "bona fide,"4 while others have employed a subjective 
standard.5 Section III provides an analysis of the term "bona fide," 
both in a literal sense and within various statutory contexts. Finally, 
this note proposes that an objective standard of interpretation of 
"bona fide" is compelled both by the literal meaning of the statute and 
by its legislative history. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Franchising has been called the " 'last frontier' of the independ­
ent businessman."6 It presents the small-time entrepreneur with the 
opportunity to invest his or her savings, time, and energy into the es­
tablishment and formation of a business, while the franchisor benefits 
by expanding its industry and avoiding large capital investments. 7 
Ideally, franchising represents a compromise between big business and 
the small, independent businessman, with the franchisor "assuming 
the economic functions of big business and the franchisee contributing 
entrepreneurship[] by making a capital investment and becoming an 
owner-manager."8 
The petroleum marketing industry is one of the oldest franchising 
industries in this country, originating before World War IJ.9 Typi­
cally, the strategy of the major oil companies has been to acquire suita­
ble property, construct a gasoline station, and lease. premises to a 
franchisee who agrees to market the products and to use the trade­
mark of the major oil company. 10 In the petroleum franchise relation­
ship, the franchisor is landlord, supplier, and grantor of the trademark 
license to the franchisee; the franchisee is tenant and distributor. I I 
The relationship between petroleum franchisor and franchisee is 
4. See infra notes 43-74 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 75-96 and accompanying text. 
6. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING, at v (1969) [hereinafter H. 
BROWN, FRANCHISING]. In this book, the author presents an overview of the potential 
pitfalls involved in undertaking a franchise operation. 
7. old. at 3. 
8. Id. 
9. Fels, The Franchising Phenomenon: An Overview, in THE FRANCHISING PHENOM­
ENON 1 (J. Rice ed. 1969). 
10. Haberthur, Petroleum Marketing Practices Act: Equalizing the Bargaining Power 
in the Franchise Relationship, 25 S.D.L. REV. 69,69 (1980). This note explores the back­
ground and operation of the PMPA, discusses judicial interpretation of the PMPA, and 
examines early cases that arose under the Act. 
11. S. REP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 873, 875 [hereinafter S. REP.]. 
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complex and historically has been fraught with competing interests. 12 
Abuses within the franchise relationship have been numerous: unrea­
sonable conditions imposed by the franchisor; inequality of bargaining 
power between the parties, resulting in a relationship dictated by the 
franchisor; arbitrary and discriminatory terminations of the franchise; 
and threats of potential termination in order to compel compliance 
with the franchisor's policies. 13 Harold Brown, a leading scholar in 
the field of franchising law, noted that "[i]t is generally conceded that 
the gasoline station situation is almost hopeless and offers a prime ex­
ample of the worst abuses in franchising."14 
Prior to the enactment of the PMPA, courts interpreted the 
franchise relationship in the petroleum marketing industry based on 
the tenets of contract law. 15 However, courts enforcing franchise con­
tracts failed to take into account the gross disparity of bargaining 
power between major oil companies and small-time franchisees. 16 The 
legislative history of the PMPA reflects the problem of inequality of 
bargaining power between the franchisor and franchisee: 
Central to the problems faced by franchisees in this regard is the 
disparity of bargaining power which exists between the franchisor 
and the franchisee. This disparity results in franchise agreements 
12. Id. The Senate Report described the competing interests which characterize the 
petroleum market franchise relationship in the following passage: 
The franchise relationship in the petroleum industry is unusual, in fact perhaps 
unique, in that the franchisor commonly not only grants a trademark license but 
often controls, and leases to the franchisee, the real estate premises used by the 
franchisee. In addition the franchisor almost always is the primary, even exclu­
sive, supplier of the franchisee's principal sale item: motor fuel. 
Id. 
13. Kleeger, Judicial Interpretation of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act: Con­
flict and Diversity, 32 EMORY L.J. 273, 275-76 (1983). 
14. Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REV. 650,657 (1971) 
[hereinafter Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship]. 
15. See, e.g., Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co., 375 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (termi­
nable at will clause held valid because parties had freedom to contract), aff'd 511 F.2d 
1393 (3d Cir. 1975); Hollander v. American Oil Co., 329 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1971) 
(there is no right to renew a lease unless the contract covenant is clear and unequivocal). 
16. See, e.g., Russell v. Shell Oil Co., 382 F. Supp. 395 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (even if the 
practice of the oil company in the past had been to establish a right to automatic renewal 
unless "good cause" was found not to renew, such a policy does not imply a "good cause" 
term into the contract agreement between the parties), aff'd, 497 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1974); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. ~ubenfeld, 48 A.D.2d 428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1975) (holding for the 
franchisor that, in the absence of a statute, it is not compelled to renew a lease beyond the 
contract term even though the franchisee invested capital and energy in the expectation of 
renewal); but see Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973) (termination 
clause was voided as against public policy because of the grossly disproportionate bargain­
ing power between the parties), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974). 
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which some franchisees have argued amount to contracts of adhe­
sion. The provisions of the contracts between the franchisor and 
the franchisee and the permeating influence of these ~ontracts over 
nearly every major aspect of the franchisee's business may translate 
the original disparity of bargaining power into continuing vulnera­
bility of the franchisee to the demands and actions of the 
franchisor. 17 
Since the relations between the two parties are essentially contractual, 
remedies for contract violations or changes in circumstances often in­
cluded termination of the franchise agreement. IS Because of the time, 
money, and commitment he or she has invested in the business, the 
expectation of the franchisee is that the franchise be a continuing one. 
A remedy of termination is in direct conflict with the expectations of 
the franchisee. The Senate Report, which describes the Senate Com­
mittee's discussion of the PMPA prior to its passage, states that termi­
nation of the franchise is essentially punitive and extreme. 19 
Likewise, the prospect of nonrenewal permeates the franchise re­
lationship and manifests itself as a threat by which the franchisor may 
compel the franchisee to comply with its marketing practice.20 Harold 
Brown describes the pre-PMPA situation as one in which the major oil 
firms, the nation's second largest industry, have their gasoline-station 
dealers "in virtual bondage, hinged on the constant threat that their 
short-term contracts will not be renewed unless they submit to bur­
densome franchisor-imposed practices."21 
The 1973-74 Arab oil embargo and resulting energy crisis 
17. S. REP., supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 876. Harold Brown describes this disparity in the following passage: 
There is a marked, intentional, and constantly emphasized disparity in the posi­
tions of the parties-the franchisor combining the roles of father, teacher, and 
drill sergeant, with the franchisee, relegated to those of son, pupil, and buck­
private, respectively. At the core of the franchise relationship is the contractual 
control exercised by the franchisor over every aspect of the franchisee's business. 
H. BROWN, FRANCHISING, supra note 6, at 41. 
18. The Senate Report noted that "[t]he disparity of bargaining power which disad­
vantages the franchisee in negotiations leading to execution of the franchise agreement 
manifests itself in the contractually provided remedies for contract violations or changes in 
circumstances .... [T]ermination of franchise agreements during the term as a remedy for 
contract violations has been repeatedly utilized." S. REP., supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 
1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 876. 
19. The Senate Report stated: "Termination is an extreme remedy. It is fund amen­
tally punitive and not compensatory in nature, i.e., the franchisor is not compensated for 
any financial injury experienced by reason of the franchisee's contractual violations. In­
stead the franchisee is punished through contract termination." Id. 
20. Id. at 18, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 877. 
21. Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 14, at 655. 
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changed the nature of petroleum marketing.22 Due to the increase in 
the price of gasoline, the consumer became more interested in price 
than in the brand of gasoline which he or she purchased.23 Moreover, 
due to the general tightening of the supply of oil as well as increased 
supply costs, the major oil companies looked for more economical dis­
tribution methods.24 They found that, by terminating franchises and 
boosting the number of salaried (i.e., company-owned and operated) 
retail outlets, they could operate more economically.25 The Depart­
ment of Energy received numerous complaints that franchisors were 
terminating or not renewing franchises for "arbitrary and even dis­
criminatory" reasons. 26 Terminations were based upon hypertechni­
cal, insignificant, or unreasonable provisions of the franchise 
agreement.27 Thus, the franchisee, with the expectation that the 
franchise relationship would be a continuing one, was in the position 
of having invested money and time into building his or her business 
and clientele only to have it terminated or not renewed by the oil 
company. 
The PMPA was passed in 1978 in an attempt·to equalize the bar­
gaining positions of franchisees and franchisors in the petroleum in­
dustry.28 Congress intended that "[a]n essential requirement of 
Federal legislation is that the grounds for termination and nonrenewal 
... not be so broad as to deny franchisees meaningful protections from 
arbitrary or discriminatory terminations and non:-renewals or to pre­
vent fulfillment of the reasonable renewal expectations of franchis­
22. Using the supply of petroleum as a political weapon, the Arab nations instigated 
an oil embargo against the United States which resulted in a 10-17% reduction in oil sup­
plies. The effect was a significant increase in the price of petroleum and petroleum prod­
ucts, which precipitated gasoline rationing plans. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 30, col. 
5; N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1974, at 1, col. 7. 
23. Even after the Arab oil embargo was lifted, the price of gasoline remained signifi­
cantly higher than it had been before the embargo. See generally N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 
1974, at 1, col. 6. 
24. Haberthur, supra note 10, at 70. 
25. W. Fox, FEDERAL REGULATION OF ENERGY 367-68 (1983). 
26. S. REP., supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 875-76. 
27. Kleeger, supra note 13, at 277. See, e.g., William C. Comitius, Inc. v. Wheeler, 
276 Or. 747, 556 P.2d 666 (1976). In Cornitius, the franchisee was offered a renewal lease 
at a rate significantly higher than that being charged other dealers similarly situated. Id. at 
749-50, 556 P.2d at 667. The court held that the service station lease was not unconsciona­
ble because of the absence of a provision requiring the lessor to renew on reasonable terms. 
Id. at 747, 556 P.2d at 666. 
28. S. REP., supra note 11, at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 877. 
394 	 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11 :389 
ees."29 Congress also remained aware of the needs of the franchisor, 
recognizing that certain actions of the franchisee, such as failure to 
comply with contractual obligations or certain changes in circum­
stances,30 would evoke the franchisor's legitimate need to terminate 
the franchise relationship.31 
The PMPA provides that a franchisor engaged in the sale, con­
signment, or distribution of motor fuel in commerce may not termi­
nate32 or fail to renew33 the franchise agreement, except as specifically 
29. 	 Id. 
30. The PMPA specifies examples of "events" which would render the franchisor's 
termination of the franchise relationship reasonable: fraud or criminal misconduct by the 
franchisee relevant to the operation of the marketing premises, bankruptcy or insolvency of 
the franchisee, severe physical or mental disability of the franchisee, loss of the franchisor's 
right to possession of the premises through the expiration of an underlying lease, condem­
nation of the premises, loss of the franchisor's right to the trademark, destruction of all or 
of a substantial part of the premises, failure of the franchisee to pay the franchisor sums due 
to him in a timely manner, failure of the franchisee to operate the premises for an unreason­
able period of time, wilful trademark violation by the franchisee, knowing violation by the 
franchisee of laws or regulations regarding the franchise, or conviction of the franchisee of 
a felony involving moral turpitude. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(c) (1982). 
31. S. REP., supra note 11, at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 877. 
32. Section 2802(b)(2) of the PMPA sets forth the following preconditions and 
grounds for termination or nonrenewal of a franchise relationship: 
(A) A failure by the franchisee to comply with any provision 	of the franchise, 
which provision is both reasonable and of material significance to the 
franchise relationship, if the franchisor first acquired actual or constructive 
knowledge of such failure .... 
(B) A failure by the franchisee to exert good faith efforts to carry out the provi­
sions of the franchise . . . . 
(C) 	The occurrence of an event which is relevant to the franchise relationship 
and as a result of which termination of the franchise or nonrenewal of the 
franchise relationship is reasonable, if such event occurs during the period 
the franchise is in effect and the franchisor first acquired actual or construc­
tive knowledge of such occurrence .... 
(D) 	An agreement, in writing, between the franchisor and the franchisee to ter­
minate the franchise or not to renew the franchise relationship .... 
(E) 	[A] determination made by the franchisor in good faith and in the normal 
course of business to withdraw from the marketing of motor fuel through 
retail outlets in the relevant geographic market area in which the marketing 
premises are located, if . 
(i) such determination­
(I) 	was made after the date such franchise was entered into or rel1ewed, 
and 
(II) 	was based upon the occurrence of changes in relevant facts and cir­
cumstances after such date; . 
(ii) the termination or nonrenewal is not for the purpose of converting the 
premises, which are the subject of the franchise, to operation by employ­
ees or agents of the franchisor for such franchisor's own account .... 
15 	U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2) (1982). 
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provided by the PMPA or the franchise agreement. One reason which 
the PMPA allows for nonrenewal is economic infeasibility. 34 If a de­
33. Section 2802(b )(3) of the PMPA sets forth the following grounds for the nonre­
newal of a franchise relationship: 
(A) The failure of the franchisor and the franchisee to agree to changes or addi­
tions to the provisions of the franchise . . . . 
(B) The receipt 	of numerous bona fide customer complaints by the franchisor 
concerning the franchisee's operation of the marketing premises .... 
(C) 	A failure by the franchisee to operate the marketing premises in a clean, safe, 
and healthful manner . . . . 
(D) [A] determination made by the franchisor in good faith and in the normal 
course of business, if ­
(i) such determination is 
(I) to convert the leased marketing premises to a use other than the 
sale or distribution of motor fuel, 
(II) to materially alter, add to, or replace such premises, 
(III) to sell such premises, or 
(IV) that 	renewal of the franchise relationship is likely to be un­
economical to the franchisor despite any reasonable changes or 
reasonable additions to the provisions of the franchise which may 
be acceptable to the franchisee 
(ii) 	with respect to a determination referred to in subclause (II) or (IV), 
such determination is not made for the purpose of converting the leased 
marketing premises to operation by employees or agents of the 
franchisor for such franchisor's own account; and 
(iii) in the case of leased marketing premises such franchisor ... either­
(I) made a bona fide offer to sell, transfer, or assign to the franchisee 
such franchisor's interests in such premises; or 
(II) if applicable, offered the franchisee a right of first refusal of at least 
45-days duration of an offer, made by another, to purchase such 
franchisor's interest in such premises. 
15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3) (1982). 
34. 15 U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(IV) (1982). The legislative history is copious on 
this point. The statutory test regarding nonrenewal based on economic infeasibility is 
whether the renewal of the franchise relationship is likely to be uneconomical, as distin­
guished from unprofitable. S. REP., supra note II, at 36, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 895. Thus, profitability can be considered in a broad economic 
sense. The Senate Report illustrated the distinction with the following example: 
[A] franchise relationship which would return a net profit of $1.00 per year to the 
franchisor might be profitable in an absolute sense. Nevertheless, considering the 
investment of the franchisor in the facility, renewal of the franchise relationship 
might not be economically j~stified. In addition, any evaluation of the economics 
of renewal must be made in view of changes in the terms or conditions of the 
franchise agreement which may be acceptable to the franchisee. Thus, the 
franchisor may not claim that costs have soared, thereby rendering renewal of the 
franchise relationship uneconomic, and ignore the willingness of the franchisee to 
.agre"e i~ increase pay~ents which would offset those increased costs. ­
Id.­
·Mor~ver, the evaluations of the economics of renewal may not be influenced by the 
fact that operation of the premises would be more economical by employees of the 
fra~chisor followin~ a non renewal. Id. The Senate Report stressed that the good faith 
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termination is made by the franchisor in good faith and in the normal 
course of business that the renewal of the franchise relationship is 
likely to be uneconomical to him, the franchisor may decide not to 
renew the franchise. 35 However, the franchisor must make a bona fide 
offer to sell, transfer, or assign his interest in the leased premises to the 
franchisee. 36 
The "bona fide offer" of sale requirement imposed by the PMPA 
is not discussed in the legislative history of the statute. However, by 
including such a provision, it seems that Congress intended to benefit 
the franchisee by affording him or her the opportunity to purchase the 
business which he or she has worked to build. However, courts have 
had difficulty in interpreting the requirement that the offer of sale be 
"bona fide." The extent to which the offer must approach an objective 
standard, such as the fair market value of the property, or to which it 
can be considered "bona fide" based upon the SUbjective intent of the 
offeror represent the contrasting interpretations courts have taken on 
this issue. Section II discusses the cases which represent these con­
flicting interpretations of the "bona fide offer" requirement. 
II. 	 CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON THE INTERPRETATION OF 
"BONA FIDE OFFER" 
This section presents the conflicting interpretations of the "bona 
fide offer" requirement in section 2802 of the PMPA. In Slatky v. 
Amoco Oil Co., 37 the court applied an objective standard to the term 
determination not to renew based on economic infeasibility may not serve merely as a 
means to facilitate the franchisor's objective of converting the premises to operation by its 
own employees. Id. 
35. IS U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(IV) (1982). The PMPA imposes the following time 
requirement: the section applies if the franchise was entered into prior to June 19, 1978 
(the date of passage of the Act) and the unexpired term on that date is three years or 
longer; or, alternatively, if the franchise was entered into or renewed on or after June 19, 
1978, and the term is three years or longer or the franchisee was offered a term of three 
years or longer. 15 U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D) (1982). 
36. 15 U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(I) (1982). Alternatively, the franchisee can be of­
fered a right of first refusal of at least 45-days duration on an offer made by another to 
purchase the franchisor's interest in the premises. IS U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(II) 
(1982). See supra note 33 for the statutory text. 
In addition, there are strict notification requirements in § 2804 of the PMPA which 
must be met prior to termination. The franchisor must give notice to the franchisee, by 
certified mail or personal delivery, of his intention, the reasons for his action, and the date 
on which termination or nonrenewal will take effect as well as a copy of the summary 
statement of this Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2804 (1982). 
If a franchisor does not follow the statutory guidelines, § 2805 of the PMPA allows 
the franchisee to bring a civil action in a federal district court. 15, U.S.C. § 2805(a) (1982). 
37. 830 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1987). 	 ' 
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"bona fide." In that case, the court held that, for an offer of sale to be 
"bona fide" within the meaning of the PMPA, the offer must approach 
fair market value. 38 However, in two district court cases, Brownstein 
v. Arco Petroleum Products CO. 39 and Kessler v. Amoco Oil CO.,40 the 
courts applied a subjective standard based on the franchisor's subjec­
tive belief in the fair market value of the property. In these cases, the 
courts interpreted "bona fide" offer to be an offer made in conformity 
with the franchisor's general practice of selling property and an offer 
which the franchisor subjectively believed represented fair market 
value.41 In Kim v. Mobil Oil Corp.,42 the court devised an intermedi­
ate approach which shifts the burden of proof to the franchisor to jus­
tify the high price when the offer price is shown to be higher than the 
fair market value. 
A. Slatky v. Amoco Oil CO.43 
In Slatky, the franchisee leased a gasoline station for several years 
from Amoco Oil Company (Amoco). As a result of Slatky's declining 
sales revenues, Amoco decided not to renew his franchise agreement.44 
Amoco gave Slatky the requisite notice and, based on the PMPA, 
made an offer of $306,300.()()45 to sell Slatky the service station, with­
38. [d. at 485. 
39. 604 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
40. 670 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Mo. 1987). 
41. The district court in Slatky followed the Brownstein court's reasoning. See supra 
notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
42. No. CV 85-4689 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 1986) (WESTLAW, OCT database). 
43. 830 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1987). 
44. Section 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(IV) of the PMPA provides a ground for nonrenewal of 
a franchise relationship. If the franchisor makes a determination in good faith and in the 
normal course of business that the renewal is likely to be uneconomical to him, despite any 
reasonable changes to the provisions of the franchise which may be acceptable to the fran­
chisee, the PMPA allows such a ground for nonrenewal. 15 U.S.C. § 2802 (b)(3)(D)(i)(IV) 
(1982). 
45. Amoco arrived at the $306,300.00 sale price through the following procedure. 
Amoco's capital investment representative evaluated the land and appraised its value, with­
out tanks, pumps, and improvements, at $155,000.00. Following the land appraisal, 
Amoco's project engineer performed an appraisal of the property improvements and esti­
mated the replacement cost of the improvements, including the tanks and lines, to be 
$121,300.00. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 479-80. 
Based on these two estimates, Amoco's real estate manager recommended a sales price 
of $276,300.00 to the district manager. The district manager replied that "costs as they are 
today and the improvements that we have on the property, I would believe the appraisal 
would be more reasonable at $350,000, less tanks and lines." [d. at 480. Thus, while not 
disagreeing with the procedures followed to arrive at the appraisal, the district manager 
requested a review of the figure. A second appraisal was made of the property, and this 
time the value' was determined to be $185,000.00, a figure $30,000.00 higher than the first 
estimate. Amoco offered to sell Slatky the service station for $306,300.00, which included 
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out the underground tanks and pumps.46 
Slatky made a counter-offer of $158,200.00, including the tanks 
and dispensers. Slatky had two appraisals performed, one of which 
valued the property at $158,200.00, including the pumps and tanks, 
and the other at $145,000.00, but not including the pumps and 
tanks.47 Amoco rejected Slatky's counter-offer.48 . 
'Slatky filed a complaint seeking damages and an injunction order­
ing Amoco to sell the property to him at fair market value. Although 
Slatky did not challenge .the grounds for nonrenewal, he claimed that 
Amoco's offer of $306,300.00 was not a "bona fide· offer" within the 
meaning of the PMPA because it was not based on the ~air' market 
value of the property. An independent appraisal was yommissioned by 
Amoco for the litigation, and it valued the property at $221,000.00, 
not including the 'pumps and tanks.49 
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania heid 
that Amoco's offer was bona fide. 50 Because the offer was made in the 
ordinary course of business, employing procedures normally used for 
evaluating property, and because Amoco offered the property at what 
it believed was fair market value, the court held that the "bona fide 
offer" requirement of the PMPA was met.5 1 However, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's finding and 
held that Amoco's offer to sell was not bona fide because it was not 
objectively reasonable. 52 
$185,000.00 for the land plus $121,300.00 for the improvements, but not including the 
tanks and pumps. Id. 
46. Id. at 479. Courts have interpreted the "bona fide offer" requirement not to have 
been met when the franchisor offered to sell only the real property of the marketing prem­
ises, without the underground tanks and pumps. See Roberts v. Amoco Oil Co., 740 F.2d 
602 (8th Cir. 1984); Greco v. Mobil Oil Corp., 597 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Ill. 1984). See infra 
notes 178-182. But see Tobias v. Shell Oil Co., 782.F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1986). See infra 
note 182. 
47. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 480. 
48. In a letter dated August 26, 1985, after Slatky filed his complaint, Amoco stated 
that the exclusion of the tanks and pumps was mistaken and offered Slatky the property for 
$306,300.00-$256,300.00 plus $50,000.00 for the tanks and pumps, or $306,300.00 total. 
Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Slatky v. Amoco Oil Co., 626 F. Supp. 1223 (M.D. Pa. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 476 
(3d Cir. 1987). 
51. Id. at 1227. The district court's reasoning was based on the contention that, if 
Congress intended for sales to be made at fair market value, it would have used the words 
"fair market value," rather than "bona fide" in the language of the PMPA. Id. Moreover; 
the court concluded that Slatky was properly in possession of the premises based upon the 
stipulation agreement, so Amoco was not entitled to damages. Further, the court noted 
that an award of damages would be inconsistent with the PMPA. Id. 
52. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 486. 
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On appeal, Amoco's principle contention was that the term "bona 
fide" should be interpreted to require only that a franchisor's offer be 
made in subjective good faith. 53 Amoco analogized the "bona fide" 
requirement of the offer price to the statutory requirement imposed by 
the PMPA that a franchisor's determination not to renew a franchise 
because of a business reason be made in "good faith and in the normal 
course ofbusiness."54 Amoco contended that the legislative history of 
the PMPA suggests that Congress sought to avoid judicial scrutiny of 
a business decision. 55 Therefore, the offer price, like the determination 
not to renew, was a business decision, which should not be second­
guessed by a court. 56 
The court of appeals rejected Amoco's analogy. The court dis­
agreed with the basic analogy that a business decision not to renew is 
similar to an offer for sale. 57 The court reasoned that the purpose of 
the good faith standard as applied to nonrenewal is to allow 
franchisors flexibility to respond to changing market conditions. 58 In 
contrast, because the offer price is circumscribed by the PMPA, its 
determination is not an autonomous "business decision." The court 
stated that the determination of the offer price "is not a decision that 
the distributor decides on its own to make. Rather, the distributor sets 
a bona fide price only because the statute requires it to do SO."59 The 
court characterized such a decision as a "compliance judgment" or a 
"judgment about how best to protect the company's interests while 
complying with the statute. Congress did not instruct the courts to 
53. Id. at 480. 
54. Id. at 480-81. 
55. The Senate Report stated: 
These tests provide adequate protection of franchisees from arbitrary or discrimi­
natory termination or non-renewal, yet avoid judicial scrutiny of the business 
judgment itself. Thus, it is not necessary for the court to determine whether a 
particular marketing strategy, such as a market withdrawal, or the conversion of 
leased marketing premises to a use other than the sale or distribution of motor 
fuel, is a wise business decision. 
S. REP., supra note 11, at 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 896. 
56. Statky, 830 F.2d at 481. 
57. Id. The court furtper suggested that to allow the analogy between the nonre­
newal decision and the offer price decision would confuse procedural restrictions with sub­
stantive ones. The "good faith and normal course of business" requirement imposed by the 
statute on the decision not to renew is a procedural direction for the court to use in deter­
mining whether the franchisor abided by the substantive provisions of the Act. To apply 
this procedural direction to a determination of offer price turns it into a substantive restric­
tion on the franchisor's behavior. Id. at 482. 
58. Id. at 481. 
59. Id. 
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defer to such decisions."60 
The court suggested a hypothetical situation in which the 
franchisor fails to renew the franchisee's contract because it plans to 
convert the property to a different use or to alter the premises. If the 
franchisor were required to sell the property to the franchisee, the 
franchisor's own plans for the property would be defeated.61 In such a 
situation, the franchisor's interest in retaining the property would best 
be served by setting an unreasonably high sale price for the premises 
which the franchisee could not meet. The court concluded that the 
PMPA should not be read to allow deference both to the business mer­
its of the franchisor's judgment and to its own sense of fairness of its 
offer price.62 
Having rejected Amoco's sUbjective "bona fide offer" standard, 
the court of appeals devised a two-step approach to determine whether 
a franchisor has met the "bona fide offer" requirement of the PMP A. 
First, a court must determine if a franchisor sUbjectively believed its 
offer represented the fair market value.63 Secondly, a court must de­
termine whether the offer was objectively reasonable, that is, whether 
the offer did, in fact, approach fair market value.64 The court defined 
"fair market value" as "the highest price a willing buyer would pay."65 
The court contended that the PMPA requires the franchisor to make 
an offer as if it "actually" wanted to sell the property, "not necessarily 
to the franchisee but to someone."66 
While the first part of Slatky's two-part test relied on the subjec­
tive intent of the franchisor, the court reasoned that this step was nec­
essary. There may be relevant factors other than sincere belief and 
objective reasonableness as essential elements in the determination of 
the bona fides of an offer. For example, an offer approaching fair mar­
ket value might include additional unreasonable conditions of sale.67 
The second part of the test lays out an objective standard: whether the 
offer approached the fair market value of the property. In most cases, 
the second part of the test would effectively subsume the first and 
would probably result in a single-tier objective standard. 
In arriving at its two-step approach, the court concluded that the 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 485. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 484. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 485 n.7. 
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purpose of the PMPA was to protect the franchisee's reasonable ex­
pectation of a continuing franchise relationship.68 The "bona fide of­
fer" provision prevents the franchisor from setting a high price to 
compensate it for the loss of its future business plans with the premises 
and further prevents the franchisor from setting an even higher price if 
it thought the franchisee would pay it because of the commitment he 
or she has made to the property. The court stated: 
The special desire of a franchisee to maintain the property with 
which he has worked is exactly what produces the distributor's gen­
eral bargaining advantage. Either price, a price reflecting the dis­
tributor's desire to pursue its business plans or a price reflecting the 
franchisor's special commitment to the property, might fail to com­
pensate the franchisee for the loss of his reasonable expectation of 
renewal.69 
Thus, the court posited that its two-step approach would protect the 
franchisee's reasonable expectations that the franchise relationship 
would be a continuing one. 70 
Because the district court had only determined that the property 
was offered to the franchisee at what the franchisor believed to be fair 
market value, the court of appeals remanded the case for further fact 
findings to determine that the offer price was objectively reasonable.7 1 
The court noted that Slatky had presented substantial evidence of in­
dependent appraisals demonstrating that Amoco's estimate was con­
siderably high.72 Further, the court stated that the mere following of 
68. Id. at 484. 
69. Id. 
70. In Slatky, the dissent stated that the PMPA p'uts the good faith of the franchisor 
at issue, not the fair market value of the property. For this reason, an independent ap­
praisal can hardly be required as part of the franchisor's evidentiary burden in such a case. 
The dissent, noting the balance which Congress strove to achieve with the PMPA, pointed 
to the fact that the franchisor bears the burden of going forward with evidence that he has 
complied with the statute. What the majority effectively requires is that the franchisor 
introduce evidence that it relied upon the opinion of an independent appraiser. Slatky, 830 
F.2d at 486 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
Further, the dissent contended that market value is merely a matter of opinion until 
the subject property actually does change hands. The PMPA requires, at minimum, that 
the franchisor follow its general practice for selling property. The dissent reviewed the 
procedure by which Amoco arrived at its offer price and detennined that, because Amoco's 
usual appraisal procedures were followed, the franchisor subjectively believed the offer 
price to be fair. The franchisor may demonstrate its good faith by procuring an independ­
ent appraisal, but nothing in the PMPA or its legislative history demands such a require­
ment. Id. at 490-91. 
71. Id. at 486. 
72. Id. 
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reasonable procedures does not guarantee a reasonable estimate. 73 
The specific facts used by the appraisers in,determining the value of 
the property and the inferences drawn from these facts must be evalu­
ated by the court on remand in order to determine an objectively rea­
sonable offer price. 74 
B. A Subjective Interpretation of "Bona Fide" 
Two federal district court cases interpreted the "bona fide offer" 
requirement in the PMPA to reflect the franchisor's subjective belief in 
the value of the property as long as the determination of the price was 
made in the normal course of business. This approach, adhered to by 
the district court in Slatky was rejected on appeal by the Third Circuit 
in Slatky v. Amoco.75 
1. Brownstein v. Arco Petroleum Products Co.76 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania interpreted the "bona fide 
offer" requirement a year before Slatky in a factually similar case. In 
Brownstein, Arco Petroleum Products Co. (Arco) made an offer to sell 
the service station to the franchisee, Brownstein, at a price that was 
16% over that estimated by the franchisee's appraisers.77 The fran­
chisee's two appraisal figures were $190,000.00 and $192,000.00 re­
spectively.78 Arco hired an appraiser who appraised the property at 
$250,000.00, and Arco set the offer price at $290,000.00.79 An inter­
nal Arco worksheet noted that the asking price was well over fair mar­
ket value. 80 Ar~o argued that nothing in its policy required it to offer 
the property at fair market value, nor did the PMPA compel that the 
73. Id. at 485. 
74. Id. 
75. 830 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1987). 
76. 604 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The decision by the court of appeals in Statky 
effectively overruled Brownstein. However, it is included here because it first established 
the subjective standard which was relied upon by the district court decisions in Slatky v. 
Amoco Oil Co., 626 F. Supp. 1223 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Kessler v. Amoco Oil Co., 670 F. 
Supp. 853 (E.D. Mo. 1987); and Tobias v. Shell Oil Co., 782 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1986). 
77. Brownstein, 604 F. Supp. at 316. 
78. Id. at 313. Brownstein's first appraiser I!sed a market approach in which he 
compared the premises to eight other service stations in northeast Pennsylvania that were 
sold in the preceding nineteen months. Id. Brownstein's second appraiser used the cost 
approach, whereby he estimated the value of the land by comparing it to five unimproved 
parcels that had been sold in recent months, adding to that figure the depreciated reproduc­
tion costs of the building, the equipment, and the site improvements. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
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offer price be the fair market value of the property.8l 
In Brownstein, the court devised a two-fold test to determine 
whether an _offer is "bona fide" within the meaning of the PMPA. 
First, the franchisor must demonstrate that the offer was made in con­
formity with its general practice of selling property.82 Second, even if 
the franchisor is able to demonstrate that the offer was made in con­
formity with its general practices, the offer must also "meet or very 
nearly approach what the offeror believes to be the fair market value of 
the property."83 
In this case, the court determined that Arco had not satisfied even 
the first hurdle: a demonstration "at the very least that the offer was 
made in conformity with the offeror's general practice for selling prop~ 
erty."84 The court found that Arco had not demonstrated how or why 
it had adjusted the figure submitted by its appraiser or how such an 
adjustment was consistent with Arco's general practices.85 The court, 
thus, could not conclude that the offer was bona fide. The court rea­
soned that, in passing the PMPA, Congress had not intended, that a 
franchisor be able to by-pass the PMPA's elaborate mechanism by 
simply setting a price substantially in excess of what it believed to be 
the fair market value. 86 
2. Kessler v. Amoco Oil Co. 
The same two-fold sUbjective standard was set out in Kessler v. 
Amoco Oil CO.87 (Amoco), but, because it is factually different, the 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant oil com­
pany. In Kessler, a franchisee brought an action against Amoco when 
it elected not to renew the service station lease. The franchisee con­
tended that Amoco's offer to sell was not "bona fide" because the offer 
price differed from the fair market value. 88 
As evidence of the fair market value of the premises, Kessler 
presented an offer price made to Amoco by a third party, Gilco Con­
81. Id. at 313-14. 
82. Id. at 315. 
83. Id. (emphasis added). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 316. 
86. Id. at 315-16. 
87. 670 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Mo. 1987). 
88. Id. at 860. The franchisee also claimed that Amoco violated the PMPA on two 
other grounds. Kessler challenged the nonrenewal of the franchise because he claimed that 
the notice was deficient and that the decision not to renew was lacking in good faith. Id. at 
856. On both of these grounds, the court held that the franchisor had fulfilled the requisite 
PMPA precepts. Id. at 856-58. 
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struction Company (Gilco). The offer by Gilco was for $750,000.00, 
with an option to take only the land or the land and improvements. 89 
Based on Gilco's offer, the Amoco representative recommended that 
the fair market value of the land alone was $750,000.00, to which the 
improvements' value should be added.90 Amoco made an offer to 
Kessler, as required by the PMPA, for $951,157.00. Gilco then in­
creased its offer to $1,050,000.00.91 
Kessler argued that Gilco's initial offer of $750,000.00 and the 
appraisal by Amoco's representative, which indicated that the fair 
market value of the land alone was $750,000.00, were both evidence 
that the fair market value of the property was, in fact, $750,000.00. 
He further argued that Amoco's offer to him of $951,157.00 was not 
bona fide within the meaning of the PMPA because it was in excess of 
the fair market value. 92 
In granting Amoco's motion for summary judgment, the court 
interpreted the phrase "bona fide" in the PMPA to mean that the 
franchisor determine the value of the property within the normal 
course of business and that the offer price reflect the franchisor's sub­
jective belief as to the value of the property.93 The court reasoned that 
an objective standard "would make a court the arbiter between differ­
ent' appraisal figures and methods, would require an open ended in­
quiry by the court into the business practices of franchisors in 
assessing the value of property they wish to sell," and would upset the 
delicate balance sought by Congress between the protection of fran­
chisees and the interests of franchisors. 94 The court concluded that 
Kessler's assumptions that Amoco would have accepted Gilco's initial 
offer of $750,000.00 and that Gilco would have opted to take the im­
provements were not shown to be true.95 Differences of opinion as to 
the value of property alone, reckoned the court, are "insufficient to 
raise a triable issue of fact, because they do not serve to controvert 
89. Id. at 855. If Gilco purchased only the land, Amoco would be responsible for 
removing the improvements. But, in either case, Amoco was to pay a $75,000.00 commis­
sion on the sale, if completed. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 856. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 860. See Kim v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. CV 85-4689, slip op. at 30-31 (C.D. 
Cal. July 16, 1986). 
94. Kessler at 860. The court in Kessler relied heavily on the district court's holding 
in Slatky. The Kessler court stated that "Slatky holds that 'the offer must approach what 
the offeror believes is the fair market value. It does not follow, however, that defendant's 
offer must approach the fair market value as determined by plaintiff's appraisers.'" Id. 
(quoting Slatky, 626 F. Supp. at 1227). 
95. Id. 
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Amoco's affidavits demonstrating its sUbjective interpretation of the 
Gilco offer."96 
Thus, Brownstein and Kessler apply a similar subjective standard 
for determining the bona fides of an offer price. However, one federal 
district court case, Kim v. Mobil Oil Corp., 97 reflects an intermediate 
position between the Slatky objective standard and the Brownstein and 
Kessler sUbjective standard. 
C. Kim v. Mobil Oil COrp.98 
In Kim, Mobil offered to sell the leased gasoline station to fran­
chisee, Kim, at a price of $717,922.00 for the real property and 
$17,422.00 for the personal property.99 Mobil's senior real estate rep­
resentative, who submitted this figure, testified that he believed at the 
time that the fair market value of the property was actually 
$750,000.00. 100 However, a second appraisal made by Mobil valued 
the property at $420,000.00, WI and an appraisal obtained by the fran­
chisee determined the fair market value of the station to be 
$525,000.00. \02 Mobil justified its high offer price figure based on the 
following factors: the appreciation of the property since the original 
appraisal, discussions with three local real estate brokers, the quality 
of the comparable properties, the quality of the subject matter prop­
erty, scarcity of similar properties, and the current value trend in this 
area. 103 
In Kim, the court determined that when a franchisee makes a 
prima facie case that the offer was not bona fide by showing that the 
offer price was above the fair market value as assessed by appraisers, 
whether hired by the franchisee or franchisor, the burden of proving 
the bona fides of the offer shifts to the franchisor. I04 The franchisor 
must describe its procedures for arriving at its offer price, list the crite­
ria it used, demonstrate that those procedures and criteria were ap­
96. Id. at 86l. 
97. No. CV 85-4689 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 1986) (WESTLAW, DCT database). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 9. 
100. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 18. 
103. Id. at 16-17. 
104. Id. at 34. The burden of producing evidence on an issue, in general, is born by 
the first party who has pled the existence of the fact. Usually the plaintiff bears the burden 
of producing evidence on an issue because it is he/she who seeks to change the present state 
of affairs and who should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof. E. CLEARY, 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 947, § 337, at 950-51 (1984). 
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plied in the instant case, and, moreover, articulate its reasons for 
raising the offer price above fair market value. 105 The burden then 
shifts back to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact that the 
franchisor did not follow its usual procedure or that its stated reasons 
for raising the offer price were pretextual or otherwise not 
legitimate. 106 
In this case, the court found that the franchisee, Kim, had pro­
duced evidence that Mobil's offer price was higher than the fair mar­
ket value assessed by Kim's appraisers as well as appraisers hired by 
Mobil. 107 However, in response, Mobil produced evidence that the of­
fer price was determined through its regular procedures and that its 
regular criteria were used regarding the leased property. Further­
more, Mobil had thoroughly articulated the reasons why the offer 
price was higher than the appraised values. lOB The court, therefore, 
concluded that the price it offered franchisee, Kim, was "bona fide" 
under the PMPA. 
,III. ANALYSIS OF "BONA FIDE OFFER" IN THE PMPA 
In Slatky, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit interpreted 
"bona fide" to require that an offer be objectively reasonable. The 
court correctly founded its analysis on both the contextual meaning of 
the words of the statute and on the legislative intent. Section A ana­
lyzes the meaning of the term "bona fide," in terms of its plain mean­
ing and within various contexts. The court in Brownstein, in devising 
its SUbjective standard, looked only to the plain meaning of "bona 
fide." The court in Kessler and the district court in Slatky followed 
the subjective standard set out in Brownstein. However, the court of 
appeals in Slatky examined the contextual meaning of "bona fide" as 
well. Section B analyzes the legislative intent of the statute. In pass­
ing the PMPA, Congress sought both to protect the franchisee's ex­
105. Kim, No. CV 85-4689 at 34. 
106. Id. The law of corporations employs a procedure of shifting the burden of proof 
in cases similar to the franchise cases presented here. In a conflict of interest transaction, if 
the plaintiff can prove that an interested director entered into a transaction which proved to 
be unfair to the corporation, the court shifts the burden of proof to the defendant director 
to show the intrinsic fairness of the transaction. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 
(Del. 1976). While these franchise cases do not involve interested directors, they are simi­
lar to the conflict of interest cases involving directors of corporations. These cases repre­
sent an interested party, i.e., the franchisor who may wish to retain the property, and who, 
it is argued, is in a fiduciary relationship with the franchisee. Thus, the Kim court's shifting 
the burden of proof to the interested party has precedent in the law of corporations. 
107. Kim, No. CV 85-4689 at 35. 
108. Id. 
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pectations that the franchise be on-going and to equalize the disparate 
bargaining power between the franchisee and franchisor. In both anal­
yses, it is urged that the term "bona fide" be determined by a court 
based on objective criteria, the standard established by the court of 
appeals in Slatky. 
A. Literal Interpretation 
1. The Plain Meaning Rule 
Statutory interpretation has traditionally looked first to the plain 
meaning of the words of the statute in seeking to find a clear and un­
ambiguous meaning. 109 The leading treatise on statutory interpreta­
tion notes that "courts are bound to give effect to the literal meaning 
without consulting other indicia of intent or meaning when the mean­
ing of the statutory text itself is 'plain' or 'clear and unambiguous.'llo 
However, 'whether . . . the words of a statute are clear is itself not 
always clear,' "111 and "[t]he fact that a statute has been interpreted 
differently by different courts has been cited as evidence that the stat­
ute is ambiguous and unclear."112 In interpreting the term "bona 
fide" within the meaning of the PMPA, the fact that courts have de­
vised three conflicting interpretations indicates that the literal words 
of the statute taken alone are unclear and that the plain meaning rule 
is inadequate in deducing the proper interpretation of "bona fide." 
In its determination that a "bona fide" offer "must meet or very 
nearly approach what the offeror believes to be the fair market value of 
the property,"l13 the district court in Brownstein relied only on the 
literal, plain meaning of "bona fide."1l4 The court in Brownstein 
quoted the following definition of "bona fide" from Black's Law Dic­
tionary: "In or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; with­
out deceit or fraud .... Real, actual, genuine, and not feigned."1l5 
109. Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470 (1917). In the seminal case on what has come 
to be known as the "plain meaning rule," Justice Day declared that "[w]here the language 
is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise 
and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion." Id. at 485. 
110. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04, at 86 (4th 
ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). . 
111. Id. (quoting Barbe ·v. United States, 392 F.2d 532, 535 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968». 
112. Id. at 86. 
113. Brownstein, 604 F. Supp. at 315. 
114. Id. Likewise, the district court in Kessler and the district court in Slatky pres­
ent similar arguments. Kessler, 670 F. Supp. at 860; Slatky, 626 F. Supp. at ~226. 
115. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 160-61 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis 
added». 
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Literally, "bona fide" is a Latin ablative meaning "in good faith."II6 
The meaning of the term "bona fide" cannot be ascertained by a 
canvass of its definitions alone, as the court in Brownstein at­
tempted. II7 While an element of subjective motivation and intent of 
the actor is implied within these literal dictionary definitions, single 
. words have little meaning when taken out of the context in which they 
are used. Hart and Sacks in "Statutory Interpretation" urge that "[i]n 
deciding whether words will bear a particular meaning, a court needs 
to be linguistically wise and not naive. It needs to understand, espe­
cially, that meaning depends upon context."118 The court in Brown­
stein, which relied solely on the dictionary definition of "bona fide," 119 
failed to make this necessary step from the plain meaning of the term 
"bona fide" to an inquiry into its contextual meaning. While the term 
"bona fide" defined alone may imply an dement of subjectivity, the 
. context within which it is used is generally more supportive of an in­
terpretation based on objective criteria. 
In attempting to ascertain a SUbjective or objective approach to 
the term' "bona fide," the plain meaning alone is inadequate and fur­
ther investigations into the contextual meaning of "bona fide" are nec­
essary. The next section explores various statutory contexts in which 
"bona fide" is used, and it examines judicial interpretations which 
have consistently rendered an objective interpretation. 
2. Contextual Analysis of "Bona Fide" 
In many different contexts, an objective standard is used as an 
interpretive yardstick to measure the bona fides of the noun qualified 
as "bona fide." 120 The courts in Brownstein, Kessler, and Kim failed to 
116. H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 61 (1965). The 
district court in Slatky and the court in Kim based their analyses upon the plain meaning 
approach enunciated in Brownstein. The court in Kessler based its reasoning upon the 
district court in Slatky and on Kim. 
117. Brownstein, 604 F. Supp. at 315. 
118. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process (1958) (unpublished manuscript). 
119. Brownstein, 604 F. Supp. at 315. 
120. Perhaps the most common legal usage of "bona fide" is in the context of bona 
fide purchaser in the common law of property. A bona fide purchaser is one who has 
purchased property for valuable consideration without any notice of a defect in the title of 
the seller. Before assigning the legally-protected status of bona fide purchaser, the law re­
quires a subjective inquiry into the state of mind of the purchaser and the objective stan­
dards of constructive and real notice. R. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.10 
(1984). 
Notice can be acquired in any of three ways. First, there can be actual notice of the 
seller's defective title, in which case an inquiry is made into the subjective state of the 
purchaser's mind. If the purchaser knew of a defect in the seller's title, he is denied status 
as a bona fide purchaser under the law, and title to the property remains with the other 
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make this inquiry into the contextual meaning of "bona fide." 
In Slatky, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit inquired 
into the contextual meaning of the term. The court found that, while 
the purposes and intentions of the actor may be relevant, to determine 
the bona fides of each noun, objectively verifiable characteristics must 
be examined. 121 The Slatky court listed several statutory categories 
required to be "bona fide": "'bona fide student,' "122 a " 'bona fide 
parent-child relationship,' "123 a " 'bona fide member of the crew' "124 
of a vessel, and employees of a " 'bona fide United States incorporated 
nonprofit organization.' "125 All of these statutory categories are de­
termined by courts based on objective criteria. 126 
Three statutory contexts are presented below in which the term 
"good faith" is analyzed. The term "good faith" has the same literal 
definition as "bona fide."127 In each context, courts have used objec­
tive criteria as a standard to determine the status of each category. In 
interpreting the "bona fide offer" requirement of the PMPA, courts 
should be guided by these comparable statutory contexts. 
First, similar to the PMPA is the Au~omobile Dealers Day in 
Court Act. 128 The Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act was passed 
by Congress to protect automobile franchisees by imposing statutory 
requirements of good faith upon their relationship with the automobile 
manufacturers. The Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act defines 
"good faith" as a duty to "act in a fair and equitable manner toward 
each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, 
intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other 
party. Second, notice can be constructive and, thus, imputed to the purchaser-if a visual 
inspection of the property or interrogation of those in possession of the property indicate 
that the seller has defective title. Third, information found in public records is always 
imputed to the purchaser as constructive notice. Id. 
The second and third ways in which notice can be acquired are based on objective 
standards. If there are objective, external realities to indicate that the seller of the property 
does not have good title, the law imposes a duty to inquire upon the bona fide purchaser. If 
he fails to make this inquiry, he is deemed to have had constructive notice, and he loses his 
bona fide purchaser status. Id. 
121. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 483. 
122. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (1982)). 
123. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(I)(D) (1982)). 
124. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.c. § 1287 (1982)). 
125. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1430(c) (1982)). 
126. Id. 
127. "Bona fide" is the Latin translation of "good faith," which is defined as "in 
accordance with standards of honesty, trust, sincerity." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 822 (S. F1exner, ed. 1987). 
128. 15 U.S.c. § 1222 (1982). 
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party."129 This "good faith" requirement is determined by courts 
within the context of coercion or intimidation of the franchisee by the 
motor company.13o Courts analyze objective criteria----evidence of co­
ercion or intimidation-in making the determination of "good 
faith,"131 considering even the propriety or reasonableness of the con­
tract itself. 132 
A similar "good faith" requirement is imposed in Chapter 13 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. \33 In determining whether a: debtor's plan of 
less than full repayment to unsecured creditors should be con­
firmed,134 several courts hold that the debtor's situation and other cir­
cumstances should be considered by the court, \35 and several hold that 
the determination should be made based solely on the amount of the 
repayment. 136 In either case, objective criteria-the debtor's circum- . 
stances or the factual amount of repayment-are used iIi the 
determination. 
Finally, "the term 'good faith' is specifically set forth in approxi­
mately 50 of the 400 sections of the Uniform Commercial Code 
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1982). Moreover, the Automobile Dealers Day in Court 
Act notes that "recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument 
shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith." Id. 
130. See Hanley v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 433 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1970); Southern 
Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967),cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 832 (1967); Cecil Corley Motor Co., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 
819 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Blenke Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ind. 
1962); Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Cal. 1960). 
131. See, e.g., Zebelman v. Chrysler Corp., 299 F. Supp. 653, 658 (E.D. Mo. 1968) 
(holding that the "good faith" requirement imposed by the Act on the termination of the 
franchise agreement be actually based on evidence of poor performance rather than on 
some ulterior motive of the manufacturer). 
132. Annotation, Good Faith-Automobile Dealer, 50 A.L.R. FED. 246, 247 (1980). 
133. 11 U.S.c. § 1325(a)(3) (1982). 
134. Section 1325(a) states, "The court shaH confirm a plan if- ... (3) the plan has 
been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law." Id. 
135. See Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982). In Deans, the court 
enumerated the following factors relevant in the determination of good faith: the percent­
age of the proposed repayment to unsecured creditors; the debtor's financial situation; the 
period of time payment will be made; the debtor's employment history and prospects; the 
nature and amount of unsecured claims; the debtor's past bankruptcy failings; and any 
unusual or exceptional problems facing the particular debtor.' The only subjective factor a 
court should consider is the debtor's honesty in representing facts. Id. at 972. Therefore, 
the court in Deans used almost exclusively objective criteria in its intt:rpret~tion.of !'good 
faith." See also In Re Estus, 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982); In Re' Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th 
Cir. 1982); In Re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982). 
136. See In Re Lambert, 10 Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 223 (1981); In Re Levine, 10 Bankr. 
D. Mass. 168 (1981); In Re Murallo, 4 Bankr. D. Conn. 666 (1980). 
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(U.C.C.)."137 The Official Comment to section 2-209 of the U.C.C. 
provides that when merchants are seeking a modification of their con­
tract agreement, the test of "good faith" includes" 'observance of rea­
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade' ... and may 
in some situations require an objectively demonstrable reason for seek­
ing a modification." 138 Ernest Gellhorn notes that this sense of the 
term "good faith" has nothing to do with the state of mind of the 
actor, but relates to the fairness or reasonableness of the 
performance. 139 
Thus, in the statutory contexts of the Automobile Dealers Day in 
Court Act, the Bankruptcy Code, and the Uniform Commercial Code 
courts have interpreted "good faith" based exclusively upon objective 
criteria. Courts' interpretation of the "bona fide offer" requirement of 
the PMPA can be guided by these similar contextual analyses. "Bona 
fide" is also used in a different section of the PMPA in the context of 
the receipt of "bona fide customer complaints" as a ground for the 
nonrenewal of a franchise relationship.l40 An analysis of the judicial 
interpretations of this section of the PMPA is instructive in defining a 
contextual interpretation of "bona fide." 141 
In Robertson v. Mobil,142 the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir­
137. Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Right~Franchise Cancella­
tions, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 470 n.17 (1967). 
138. V.e.e. § 2-209 Comment (1977). 
139. Gellhorn, supra note 137, at 470 n.l7. The concept of "good faith" in the 
V.C.C. has traditionally been interpreted as lacking "positive meaning" or as "the absence 
of bad faith." This "excluder analysis" has been emphatically rejected by other scholars. 
All excluder terms are parasitic upon other terms for their existence. However, in this case, 
both "good faith" and "bad faith" are parasitic or "substantive-hungry." Thus, the "ex­
cluder analysis" fails because "there must be some concept (a substantive) upon which 
good faith is parasitic." Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith 
Performance and Enforcement Under Anicle Nine, 137 V. PA. L. REV. 335, 346-49 (1989). 
140. Section 2802(b)(3) of the PMPA provides: 
[flor purposes of this sub-section, the following are grounds for nonrenewal of a 
franchise relationship: ... (B) The receipt of numerous bona fide customer com­
plaints by the franchisor concerning the franchisee's operation of the marketing 
premises, if-{i) the franchisee was promptly appraised of the existence and na­
ture of sucp complaints following receipt of such complaints by the franchisor; 
and (ii) if such complaints related to the condition of such premises or to the 
conduct of any employee of such franchisee, the franchisee did not promptly take 
action to cure or correct the basis of such complaints. 
15 V.S.C. § 2802 (b)(3) (1982). . 
141. Sutherland notes that "[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sec­
tions and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or sec­
tion should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a 
harmonious whole." 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05, 
at 90 (4th ed. 1984). . 
142. 778 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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cuit interpreted "bona fide customer complaints" based on an objec­
tive standard. 143 In Robertson, the franchisee provided both a "mini­
serve" gasoline island and a "full-serve" gasoline island at his Penn­
sylvania station. l44 Because a "mini-serve" island usually operates at 
little or no profit, dealers often increase the prices of gasoline at their 
"full-serve" islands in order to offset their losses. 145 However, Robert­
son raised the price at the "full-serve" island substantially.146 More­
over, he advertised the price of the "mini-serve" gasoline with a large 
sign, and he did not advertise the high price of the "full-serve" island 
gasoline. 147 Mobil, the franchisor, received 126 customer complaints 
about the substantially higher "full-serve" price and misleading adver­
tising technique used by Robertson. 148 
The PMPA provides that one of the grounds upon which a 
franchisor may base a decision not to renew a franchise relationship is 
the receipt of "numerous bona fide customer complaints by the 
franchisor concerning the franchisee's operation of the marketing 
premises."149 In Robertson, the court interpreted "bona fide," when 
used to describe customer complaints, as "sincere and having a reason­
able basis in fact."150 The "reasonable basis in fact" requirement, an 
objective determination, means that the circumstance does actually ex­
ist and that the franchisee can be held reasonably accountable for the 
circumstance. lSI 
The court of appeals in Slatky relied on Robertson's "reasonable 
basis in fact" analysis. The objective criteria in Robertson were the 
actual customer complaints. The court in Robertson stipulated only 
that the complaints be true and pertain to matters about which the 
. franchisee is culpable. Similarly, the Slatky court applied the "reason­
able basis in fact" requirement to the offer price and found that it 
refers to "a range of prices with reasonable claims to being fair market 
143. Id. Justice Becker of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit wrote both the 
Statky and Robertson opinions. ' 
144. Id. at 1006. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3) (1982). See supra note 34 for the complete text of the 
statute. 
ISO. Robertson, 778 F.2d at 1008. 
lSI. Id. The court reasoned that the receipt of numerous sincere complaints is not a 
basis "for nonrenewal if the complaints are false or if they pertain to matters about which 
the franchisee is not culpable." Id. In this case, however, the complaints were true, and the 
franchisee was culpable. Id. 
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, 
value."152 The Slatky court urged courts to scrutinize the distributor's 
offer in a manner similar to that set out in Robertson. The court 
reasoned: 
a standard of scrutiny that simply focused on whether the distribu­
tor believed its offer to represent fair market value would leave the 
franchisee open to injury through sloppiness or mere error. Such a 
focus might also prove difficult to apply, for intentions are always 
difficult to discern, especially when we deal not with the intentions 
of individuals but of organizations. 153 
The courts in Brownstein, Kessler, and the district court in Slatky, 
however, held that if an appraisal was made employing procedures 
used in the normal course of business and if the franchisor offered the 
property at what it SUbjectively believed to be the fair market price, 
then the offer was bona fide within the meaning of the PMPA. The 
court of appeals in Slatky regarded this two-pronged test as inade­
quate. The court stated that "the mere following of reasonable proce­
dures ... does not necessarily result in a reasonable estimate."154 
Slatky had presented evidence that the land appraisal by Amoco was 
out-of-date, that the property had been compared to other sites which 
were inappropriate in order to determine its value, and "that the im­
provements appraisal did not represent local costS."155 A court must 
focus on specific facts presented by appraisers and on the inferences 
drawn from those facts. 156 What is necessary in the determination of 
the bona fides of the offer is not evidence of the franchisor's usual 
procedures, which may be misleading, or even deceptive, but rather 
evidence of the standard of fair market value range which the property 
commands. 157 The court in Slatky stated that a range of prices with 
reasonable claims to being the fair market value is the appropriate 
standard in determining the bona fides of the franchisor's offer.158 
152. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 485. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 485-86. 
157. While fair market value is often an elusive term, it has generally been taken to 
mean "the amount at which a property would change hands between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller, neither being under compulsion to buy or sell and both being aware of all 
relevant facts." Kim v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. CV 85-4689 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 1986) 
(WESTLAW, DCT DATABASE) at 33. 
158. The court maintained that ifit were "to mandate that courts determine whether 
the distributor's offer actually was at fair market value, distributors could rarely rest com­
fortably that their offer would eventually be determined by the court to be fair market 
value." Stalky, 830 F.2d at 485. 
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The court in Kessler feared that an objective standard based on a 
range of fair market value would make the court an arbiter between 
different appraisal methods and figures and would require an extensive 
inquiry by the court into the business practices of the franchisor. 159 
While the Slatky standard would require scrutiny of appraisals to as­
certain a range of fair market values, the standard used in Kessler 
would similarly result in an extensive judicial inquiry ... The court 
would be called upon to evaluate the franchisor's method of valuation 
of the property as determined through the franchisor's normal course 
of its business. Not only is the "normal course qf business" internal to 
the franchisor, and, thus, subject to abuse by the interested party; but 
as the Slatky court noted, "[t]he mere following of reasonable proce­
dures ... does not necessarily result in a reaspnable estiplate."l60 
Thus, the term "bona fide" can only be fully understood through 
a contextual analysis. The court of appeals in Slatky, in determining 
the meaning of "bona fide" within section 2802 of the PMPA, per­
formed such a contextual analysis and a~ved at an objective interpre­
tation of "bona fide." The approach of Brownstein, followed by 
Kessler and the district court in Slatky, focuses only upon the diction­
ary definition of "bona fide." The SUbjective standard which the 
Brownstein court lays out is an inadequate, short-sighted interpreta­
tion which fails to reflect a linguistically comprehensive construction. 
Even if the literal interpretation of the words "bona fide" themselves 
do not compel an objective definition, the legislative intent of the 
PMPA, explored in the next section, mandates that the words be given 
such a reading. 
B. Legislative Intent 
The specific PMPA provision which requires that the offer for 
sale be. "bona fide" was not discussed in the legislative history of the 
PMPA. However, an objective interpretation of "bona fide" as set out 
in Slatky best comports with the overriding purposes of the Act. By 
requiring that the offer price reflect a range of fair market values, the 
court guarantees to the franchisee an offer price based upon the reali­
ties of the marketplace. The subjective "bona fide offer" standard set 
out in Brownstein and Kessler could result in an offer price based upon 
the franchisor's alternative business plans or its desire to reap a huge 
profit because of the franchisee's special attachment to the property. 
These possibilities do not afford the franchisee the protections which 
159. Kessler, 670 F. Supp. at 860. 
160. Slalky, 830 F.2d at 485. 
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Congress contemplated by the passage of the PMP A. Furthermore, in 
Brach v. Amoco Oil Co. ,161 the SeventhCircuieCourt of Appeals urged 
that the PMPA "must be given a liberal construction consistent with 
its overriding purpose to protect franchisees."162 
The intended beneficiary of the Act's remedial provisions is the 
small-time petroleum marketing franchisee. 163 The Senate Report be­
gins with the statement: 
Title I establishes protection for franchisees from arbitrary or dis­
criminatory termination or nonrenewal of their franchises. The title 
prohibits a franchisor from terminating a franchise during the term 
of the franchise agreement and from failing to renew the relation­
ship at the expiration of the franchise term, unless the termination 
or nonrenewal is based upon a ground specified or described in the 
legislation and is executed in accordance with the notice require­
ments of the legislation. l64 
The PMPA was passed as a result of the major oil companies pursuing 
a policy of termination and nonrenewal, thwarting the expectations of 
the franchisee that the franchise relationship was to be a continuirig 
one. 165 
An objective reading of "bona fide" best comports with Congress' 
stated goals of protecting the franchisee's reasonable expectation of 
continuing the franchise relationship. 166 Congress intended the words 
"bona fide" to qualify the offer price in order to protect the franchisee 
from an unreasonably high offer price which would preclude his 
purchasing the business. The court in Slatky suggested that a 
franchisor who wished to retain the premises to further its own busi­
161. 677 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1982). In Brach, the court held that, in reviewing a 
franchisor's business decision not to renew a franchise relationship, the PMPA first re­
quires that the decision be made in "good faith" and, second, that the determination be 
made "in the normal course of business." Id. at 1222. 
It was this business decision not to renew the franchise which the Slatky court distin­
guished from the determination of the offer price, characterized by the Slatky court as a 
"compliance judgment." Slatky, 830 F.2d at 481. See supra notes 53-61 and accompany­
ing text. 
162. Brach, 677 F.2d at 1221. 
163. See supra Section I. 
164. S. REP., supra note II, at 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 874. 
165. The Senate Report stated that "[i]t is also important to note that often the rea­
sonable expectations of the parties to a motor fuel franchise are that the relationship will be 
a continuing one. This expectation by the franchisee, in particular, is often the result of, 
and fostered by, statements and actions ofthe franchisor." [d. at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 876. 
166. [d. 
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ness plans would set an offer price out of reach of the franchisee. 167 A 
franchisor may wish to alter the premises, replace the premises, or use 
it for a different purpose. If the "bona fide offer" requirement were 
based on the sUbjective standard set out in Brownstein and Kessler, a 
franchisor could, to further its own business plans, set an exorbitant 
offer price and thwart the franchisee's expectation that his business 
continue. The "bona fide" offer which is made to the franchisee must 
be based on a range of fair market values in order to advance the con­
gressional goal of protecting the franchisee's expectation of a continu­
ing franchise relationship. 
In addition, Congress' intent to equalize the disparity of bargain­
ing power between franchisor and franchisee 168 is furthered by an in­
terpretation of "bona fide offer" based on objective criteria. The court 
in Slatky suggested that "[t]he special desire of a franchisee to main­
tain the property with which he has worked is exactly what produces 
the distributor's general bargaining advantage."169 The franchisee is 
unlike other potential buyers of the property because he or she has a 
strong personal commitment to the property based upon the effort he 
or she has put into the business in the past. This commitment places 
him or her at a disadvantage in terms of his bargaining position at the 
time of sale. The Brownstein/Kessler SUbjective interpretation of 
"bona fide offer" would allow a franchisor to set an especially high 
offer price if it thought the franchisee would pay it because of his or 
her personal commitment to the business and to this particular prop­
erty. However, if "bona fide" is given an objective meaning, the 
franchisor is constrained by an appraisal based on a range of fair mar­
ket values. The bargaining positions between the franchisor and fran­
chisee are equalized because the offer price reflects the reality of the 
marketplace, rather than resulting from the unique relationship be­
tween franchisor and franchisee. Thus, in determining whether "bona 
fide" should be given a subjective or objective meaning, an objective 
interpretation is much more promotive of Congress' specified intent of 
equalizing the disparity of bargaining power between franchisor and 
franchisee. 
While the "bona fide offer" provision of the PMPA was not spe­
cifically addressed in the congressional history, the term "in good 
faith," which the PMPA imposes upon the economic decision by the 
167. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 484. 
168. S. REP., supra note II, at 18, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 877. 
169. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 484. 
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franchisor not to renew,170 was discussed. When a franchisor deter­
mines that the renewal of a franchise relationship is likely to be un­
economical to it, the franchisor is allowed not to renew the franchise, 
if such a determination was made "in good faith and in the normal 
course of business." 171 
The legislative history reveals that with the "in good faith" re­
quirement, Congress sought "to preclude sham determinations from 
being used as an artifice for termination or nonrenewal." 172 Congress 
presumed that the tests of "in good faith" and "in the normal course 
of business" provided: 
adequate protection of franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory 
termination or nonrenewal, yet avoid judicial scrutiny of the busi­
ness judgment itself. Thus, it is not necessary for the courts to de­
termine whether a particular marketing strategy, such as a market 
withdrawal, or the conversion of leased marketing premises to a use 
other than the sale or distribution of motor fuel, is a wise business 
decision. 173 
The court in Slatky suggested that a sUbjective interpretation of "bona 
fide" would permit judicial deference both to the business judgment 
not to renew and to the franchisor's sense of the fairness of its offer 
price. 174 Franchisors would, thus, 'be allowed "to 'eat their cake and 
have it too.' "175 The court contended that such an interpretation mis­
reads the legislative history. 176 
One court of appeals case and one district court case have inter­
preted the "bona fide offer" provision of section 2802 when the offer 
has included only the real property and not the gasoline storage tanks. 
These cases differ from the line of cases discussing the bona fides of the 
offer price because they deal with what property must be included in 
the offer for the offer to be "bona fide" rather than the bona fides of 
the particular price. These cases are presented because they attest to 
the courts' concern with effectuating Congress' goals of equalizing the 
disparity of bargaining power between the franchisee and 
franchisor. 177 Moreover, these cases typify the courts' liberal interpre­
170. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D) (1982). 
171. Id. 
172. S. REP., supra note 11, at 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 896. 
173. Id. 
174. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 481. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text. 
175. Id. at 482. 
176. Id. 
177. S. REP., supra note 11, at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 877. 
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tation of the PMPA in favor of protecting the franchisee. 
In Roberts v. Amoco Oil Co., J78 the court looked to the broader 
dual purposes of the PMPA in remedying the disparity of bargaining 
power between franchisor and franchisee and in preserving the com­
petitive influence of the independent franchisee in the marketplace. I79 
These ends would be defeated if the franchisor were allowed to ex­
clude from its offer of sale to the franchisee the equipment necessary 
for the continuation of the business. ISO Similarly, in Greco v. Mobil Oil 
Corp. ,181 the court noted that when reviewing a question under the 
PMPA, a court should be guided by the principle that remedial legis­
lation, such as this, should be given a liberal construction with its pur­
pose to protect franchisees. 182 
The holdings in Roberts and Greco il1dicate a resolve on the part 
of the courts to effectuate the congressional intent of the PMPA to 
protect the franchisee. Similarly, in the interpretation of the "bona 
178. 740 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1984). In Roberts, a franchisee brought suit against 
Amoco contending that Amoco's offer to sell its service station- excluding the gasoline 
pumps, dispensers, storage tanks, piping and other equipment- was not a "bona fide" offer 
under the PMPA. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that "a 'bona fide' 
offer to sell leased marketing premises under the PMPA must include ... the equipment 
used in distributing motor fue1." Id. at 607. 
179. Id. at 606. 
180. Id. 
181. 597 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Ill. 1984). In Greco, a Mobil franchisee brought suit 
seeking an injunction of Mobil's termination of the franchise. Id. Mobil had offered Greco 
a right of first refusal of a third party's contract, but, because the contract between Mobil 
and the third party was only for the sale of the land and not the personal property of the 
station, the right of first refusal made to Greco was only for the land. Id. at 470. Because 
Mobil violated the PMPA by not making Greco a proper offer to purchase, the court held 
that the franchisee was entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting termination of the 
franchise. Id. at 474. 
182. Id. at 471 (citing Brach v. Amoco Oil Co., 677 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1982». In a 
third case, Tobias v. Shell Oil Co., 782 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1986), a franchisee brought a 
similar suit under the PMPA claiming that Shell's offer of sale was not "bona fide" because 
Shell did not include the underground gasoline storage tanks in its offer. These steel tanks 
(three of which had been in use for twenty years, one for seventeen years, and one for 
thirteen years) were not included in the offer because of their age and the risk of leaking. 
Id. at 1173. Shell introduced evidence of its program of systematically replacing its steel 
underground tanks with fiberglass ones, having already made such replacements in five­
sixths of the stations in Tobias' region. Essentially deciding the issue on environmental 
grounds, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Shell did fulfill its obligation 
to make a "bona fide" offer even though the offer did not include the faulty storage tanks. 
Id. at 1174. 
Tobias can be easily distinguished from Roberts and Greco because the court's reason­
ing was essentially based on environmental issues rather than on the PMPA. The court in 
Tobias held that, because Shell formulated its offer through its regular corporate proce­
dures and because Tobias was not singled out for unfair treatment regarding the tanks, 
Shell had satisfied its obligations under the PMPA. Id. at 1174. 
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fide offer" provision, an objective guideline, such as a range of fair 
market values, is necessary to protect the franchisee. The court in 
Slatky stated that requiring only that the franchisor make a subjective 
good faith offer would enable franchisors "to pursue their own, unfet­
tered self-interest, [and] the statute does not generally guarantee dis­
tributors that right."183 
Thus, an objective standard better effectuates the dual congres­
sional goals of protection of the franchisee and equalizing the bargain­
ing positions between the parties. Both Slatky and Kim present 
judicial solutions based on the objective standards of fair market value. 
However, the approach advanced by the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit in Slatky better protects the interests of the franchisee 
than does the procedure set out in Kim. 
Like the range of fair market value standard set by the Slatky 
court, the district court in Kim 184 based its standard on objective crite­
ria, i.e., the fair market value of the property. However, the court in 
Kim held that, when a franchisee makes a prima facie case that the 
offer price was above fair market value as assessed by appraisers, the 
burden of proof shifts to the franchisor to articulate its reasons for 
raising the price. The Kim standard requires that the franchisor "de­
scribe its procedures for arriving at offer prices to franchisees; listing 
the criteria it uses; demonstrating that those procedures and criteria 
were applied in the instant case; and articulating its reasons for raising 
the offering price above the fair market value as determined by ap­
praisers."18S In Kim, the court held that the franchisor had satisfied 
its burden of proof because the property had appreciated at a rate of 
approximately 1% per month since the initial appraisal and the 
franchisor successfully proved that the offer price reflected this general 
increase in value. 186 
However, the Slatky resolution is more protective of the interests 
of the franchisee because both parties would present appraisals repre­
senting a range of fair market values. An offer of sale based upon the 
. fair market value of the property guarantees to the franchisee that the 
offer price is based on the economic realities of the marketplace. The 
offer is made to the franchisee as though the franchisee were any other 
buyer of the property and as though the franchisor and franchisee 
were in equal bargaining positions. In Kim, once the burden of proof 
183. Stalky, 830 F.2d at 483. 
184. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text. 
185. Kim, No. CV 85-4689 at 34. 
186. Id. at 16-17. 
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is shifted, the standard falls prey to the same defects found in the 
Brownstein and Kessler sUbjective standard: , the factors and tests em­
ployed are internal and subject both to abuse and to error. As the 
court of appeals in Slatky stated, "[t]he mere following of reasonable 
procedures, however, does not necessarily result in a reasonable 
estimate." 187 
The court in Kim actually does little more for the franchisee than 
did Brownstein and Kessler. Once the threshold of fair market value is 
passed, the standard is essentially the same as the sUbjective standard. 
If a franchisee is to be guaranteed equal bargaining power with the 
franchisor in the sale of the business, as mandated by the provisions of 
the PMPA, he or she must be made an offer that is within a range of 
fair market values. It is only by such an objective standard that bona 
fides can be guaranteed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Title I of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act has succeeded 
in eliminating arbitrary and discriminatory terminations and 
nonrenewals of petroleum marketing franchise relationships. 188 How­
ever, the congressional goals of equalizing the disparity of bargaining 
power between franchisor and franchisee and of protecting the fran­
chisee's expectation of a continuing relationship will not be fully real­
ized until the franchisee is given a realistic opportunity to continue 
operating the business he or she has struggled to build. By requiring 
that the franchisor's offer of sale upon its nonrenewal decision be 
"bona fide," Congress sought to protect the franchisee from an offer 
price beyond his or her reach. 
Statutory interpretation based solely upon the literal, plain mean­
ing of a text, the approach taken by the court in Brownstein, is often 
inadequate in determining the meaning of a statute. 189 The fact that a 
statute has been interpreted differently by different courts is evidence 
that its meaning is ambiguous and unclear and that further inquiry is 
required. 
The court of appeals in Slatky examined the contextual meaning 
of "bona fide" and found that, in many different statutory contexts, 
courts employ an objective standard to determine "bona fide."190 The 
requirement in the PMPA that the franchisor's offer of sale upon its 
187. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 485. 
188. Kleeger, supra note 13, at 316. 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 109-119. 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 120-160. 
421 1989] THE PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICES ACT 
\ 
nonrenewal decision be "bona fide" must be read in reference to objec­
tive guidelines, such as a range of fair market values, if the provision of 
the Act is to have any meaningful significance. Shifting the burden of 
proof to the franchisor to prove why the offer price exceeds the fair 
market value, the position espoused" by the district court in Kim, does 
initially rely on objective criteria. However, once the burden of proof 
is shifted in Kim, the offer price is susceptible to internal manipulation 
or mistake, just as it was in the Brownstein/Kessler subjective 
standard. 
Thus, an analysis of the ambiguous plain meaning of the term 
"bona fide," the contextual interpretation, and the legislative history 
of the PMPA indicate that judicial interpretation of the "bona fide 
offer" of sale requirement of the PMPA be based upon objective crite­
ria such as a range of fair market values. The approach taken by the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Slatky sets such a standard. 
, 
Janet Hetherwick Pumphrey 
